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Articles
Why and How to Tax Carbont
Michael Waggoner*
Samuel Gompers, founder of the American Federation of Labor,
was asked what labor wanted. He replied, "More. 'l We cannot afford
very much "more" anymore, but we can have "better." "Better" is the
new, less carbon-intensive world.
ABSTRACT
Increased concern about possible global warming due to rising
levels of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide ("C0 2") suggests the
need to control emissions of CO 2. This article explores a system of
revenue-neutral carbon taxes as a supplement or alternative to other CO2
control systems such as subsidies, regulation, and cap-and-trade. A
system of carbon taxation should be, the Article suggests, sufficiently
fairer and simpler and more efficient than the other possible systems of
CO2 control and that it merits serious consideration. Because the carbon
t This article was presented at the CU-Energy Initiative Research Symposium in
Boulder, Colo. (Nov. 2008). It will be presented at the Society for Environmental Law
and Economics meeting in Vancouver, Canada (Mar. 2009) and the Law and Society
Association meeting in Denver, Colo. (May 2009).
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School. Professor Waggoner's research
and teaching interests include taxation and civil procedure. Thanks are due to the
University of Colorado Law School for generously supporting my scholarship, to Robert
Wall of the class of 2008 and to Eric Lund of the class of 2010 for ably assisting my
research, and to Deborah Cantrell, Richard Collins, Pat Furman, Cynthia Goff, Lakshman
Guruswamy, Howard Klemme, Mark Loewenstein, Scott Moss, Paul Ohm, James
Piccone, Mark Squillace, and Ahmed White for insightful suggestions and criticism.
1. Rosanne Currarino, The Politics of "More ": The Labor Question and the Idea of
Economic Liberty in Industrial America, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 17, (June
2006), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/joumals/jah/93.1 /currarino.html.
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tax that is suggested would be revenue neutral, it should be politically
acceptable. Problems with a carbon tax such as regressivity, possible
disruption of international trade, and impact on other societal values are
explored.
The carbon tax, it is suggested, should be enacted along with a
Value Added Tax ("VAT") for two reasons. First, the carbon tax should
start low (so as not to disrupt the economy) and increase steadily (to
create substantial incentives to reduce CO2 emissions). Revenue from the
carbon tax will rise initially as the rate increases, but eventually the
expected reduction in carbon use will cause carbon tax revenues to fall
even though rates remain high and even increase. To keep the carbon tax
revenue-neutral, other taxes will have to fall as carbon tax revenues rise,
then rise as carbon tax revenues fall. To avoid upsetting the expectations
that underlie long-term investments and planning, it may be desirable to
have relatively stable income tax rates, and thus it would be best to have
the variation occur in the VAT rates. Second, the carbon tax will be
regressive, so it should be accompanied by some form of rebate or
income maintenance program for people with low incomes. The carbon
tax initially will generate too little revenue to justify creating such a
program, but the VAT will be similarly regressive and from the start it
can generate enough revenue to justify and fund such a rebate program.
I. INTRODUCTION
To address the challenge of global warming more effectively, and to
improve its tax base, the United States should impose a revenue-neutral
carbon tax on all domestic production and importation of coal,
petroleum, and natural gas. The United States should seek to persuade
other nations that carbon taxation is a critical tool in confronting the
dangers of global warming. This Article first argues that a carbon tax is a
necessary and politically feasible tool to resist the rise in global
temperatures attributable to increased carbon dioxide ("CO 2") that
human activities have injected into the atmosphere. The Article then
explores how a carbon tax might be designed and implemented.
This carbon tax would have two major purposes. First, imposing a
tax on carbon production would create an incentive to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions. This reduction is desirable because carbon dioxide
emissions appear to be contributing significantly to global warming and
climate change, developments that may cause serious environmental
damage. 2 The carbon tax may be a better tool for carbon reduction than
2. The discussion here accepts the argument that human conduct risks increasing
greenhouse gases, and hence the risks of global warming, without exploring the role of
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alternatives such as subsidies, regulation, or cap-and-trade. 3 However,
the solution for reducing carbon emissions may include all four of these
and other approaches, as a matter of both practical politics and
administrative feasibility.
The second major purpose of taxing carbon would be to create a
more efficient and equitable means of raising revenue than taxing
income, consumption, or other typical bases for taxation. Because of this
efficiency and fairness, it is less important to determine precisely how
much and how fast the emission of CO 2 is changing the world's climate,
or to determine the possible consequences of those changes on humans
and other inhabitants of the planet.
The carbon tax proposal is based in part on agnosticism and
humility. First, while there appear to be solid reasons to believe that
human activity is contributing to global warming and that global
warming may present serious risks to humans and other inhabitants of
this planet, neither of those statements is entirely free from doubt. Even
accepting those statements, it is not clear how serious the impact will be
or how soon it will arrive. There is also uncertainty as to the trade-off
between alleviating these risks and other social values, such as freedom
and economic well-being.4 Second, it is not clear how best to proceed.
The Appendix briefly describes and evaluates systems of subsidies,
regulation, and cap-and-trade. These systems might promise more
definite reductions in carbon emissions, but the value of that definiteness
is constrained by the limits of our knowledge. Those approaches thus
other possible causes, such as fluctuations in the sun's output or the Earth's absorption or
radiation of energy. This discussion also accepts the argument that global warming may
present very serious risks, even though some areas or activities might benefit.
3. This Article addresses only the carbon tax, leaving to others the exploration of
such approaches as subsidies, regulation, and cap-and-trade, which are briefly described
in the Appendix. These different approaches will need to be evaluated carefully to
determine their effectiveness and costs, as well as political and administrative problems
in their implementation. See, e.g., Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A
Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L.
REV. 169 (2008); Eric Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J.
1565 (2008); Carol M. Rose, From H 20 to C0 2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon
Trading, 50 Aiz. L. REV. 91 (2008); Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: Is
There a Better Strategy Than Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1401 (2007); Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 411 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 841 (2006); Cinnamon Carlame, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling
Tensions Between Free Trade and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 45 (2006).
4. See generally BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING
THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001) (arguing that the economic costs of mitigating
carbon emissions outweigh the benefits).
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might reduce carbon too little or too much, and they might impose
excessively or too little on other values such as freedom and economic
well-being. With experience, a system of carbon taxes can be modified
more easily than subsidies that may already have been spent (perhaps
unwisely), regulations that may require substantial business expenditures
for compliance and government expenditures for enforcement, and
purchases of carbon emission rights that may lose value. It is clear that
the carbon tax will have the desired effect of putting downward pressure
on the level of carbon emissions, and that pressure may be adjusted
relatively easily by increasing or decreasing the tax rate in light of
experience. However, it must be admitted that all of these approaches
will have substantial costs and are likely to involve mistakes and false
starts.
This proposal is not for an add-on tax, but rather for a carbon tax to
replace revenues that would otherwise be generated. The level of revenue
to be generated should depend on political choices that are beyond the
scope of this Article. These choices include the appropriate level and mix
of governmental expenditures and the appropriate levels and subjects of
taxation, both determined in light of government revenue needs and the
reductions that taxes may impose on the economy and on incentives. The
point is that the carbon tax should not be a fund to resolve environmental
problems; rather, it should be one among many sources of governmental
funds. There may be little relationship between the level of carbon tax
needed-based on both environmental concerns and the need to avoid
too severely crimping the economy-and the expenditures needed for
environmental remediation. The amount and proportion of each source of
tax revenue to be used should be based on economic and political
considerations, and the funds generated by all sources should be
allocated through the political process.
A. Carbon Taxes and $4 Gasoline
This carbon tax proposal is not motivated by any hostility to energy
company prices or profits. That industry is highly competitive, and prices
can go down as rapidly as they rise. This was demonstrated by the
roughly fifty percent fall in petroleum prices from July to October of
2008, after a substantial run-up. The goal is rather to reduce carbon
emissions and to provide a fair and efficient tax system.
The first barrier to fair consideration of a carbon tax proposal is the
recent high price of petroleum products. To add a carbon tax of one
dollar or more per gallon to the price of gasoline, recently selling for
more than four dollars per gallon, will create serious political pushback,
jeopardizing the agendas, political careers, and perhaps even the physical
[Vol. 20:1
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safety of such a proposal's advocates. The recent reduction in energy
prices may soon be replaced by another increase. There are three major
reasons, however, why those high petroleum prices should not prevent
enacting a carbon tax.
First, the proposed carbon tax is a substitute for other taxes, not an
addition to them. For example, an individual's average income tax rate
might be twenty percent, and that individual might use seven percent of
his or her income for carbon products. That individual would be no
worse off after taxes, if a carbon tax increased the cost of the carbon
products by five percent of that taxpayer's income (from seven percent to
twelve percent of income), so long as the average rate of the income tax
were lowered by five percent (from twenty percent to fifteen percent). In
this situation, the extra cost of the carbon tax would be offset by the
reduction in the income tax.
Second, it is not clear that the price of consumed carbon will rise by
the amount of the carbon tax. Some of the tax may be absorbed by the
producers of carbon. The degree of price-shifting depends on the relative
elasticities of supply5 and demand,6 but it is unlikely that the tax will be
borne entirely by consumers. One would expect sales of carbon-based
products to fall because of the price increase created by the carbon tax.
To mitigate that drop in sales, the producer of those carbon-based
products might slightly reduce the price to avoid an overly steep drop in
sales, thus absorbing part of the tax.
This second point may have great potential. If only one nation
imposes a carbon tax, it may be that much of that tax would be borne by
that nation's population. Under these conditions, world carbon prices
will largely be set in carbon-tax-free markets, and the few carbon-taxing
nations' populations will have to pay much of the carbon tax. If most
nations impose a carbon tax, however, it may be that more of the tax will
be borne by the producers of carbon; world carbon prices will be set in
largely carbon-taxed markets, with more of the tax absorbed by the
producers. This shift of carbon taxes to carbon producers could help
undo the recent shift in world balances of power to the carbon-exporting
nations such as Iran and Venezuela-with their arguably authoritarian
regimes-and return world power back to carbon-consuming nations.
Third, individuals can change their conduct to reduce their carbon
tax liability. Although some users of certain carbon products, such as
gasoline, may have little ability to reduce their carbon-based purchases,
5. See BusinessDictionary.com, Definition of Elasticity of Supply, http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/elasticity-of-supply.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
6. See BusinessDictionary.com, Definition of Elasticity of Demand, http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/elasticity-of-demand.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
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other users may be flexible even in the short run, and even more users
should be flexible in the long run. In the short run, possibilities for
decreasing carbon use include: reducing recreational driving; planning
accordingly to accomplish several social, shopping, and business
excursions in one trip; walking, bicycling, carpooling, or using mass
transit more often; and scheduling work for four days rather than five,
reducing commuting by twenty percent. Many persons may be able to
choose to use their fuel-efficient sedan more than their fuel-guzzling
SUV, minivan, or pickup truck. Moreover, in the long run, individuals
can buy or rent more fuel-efficient cars, homes, and appliances; live
closer to work or to mass transit; invest in alternatives such as hybrid,
plug-in, or perhaps hydrogen or fuel cell 7 vehicles; and use energy
collected from solar, wind, water, geothermal, biomass, or other
sustainable sources.
Note that these three mechanisms are cumulative. As discussed in
the first point, other taxes will be reduced by the full amount of the
carbon tax. Additionally, it is likely that some of the tax will be borne by
producers, so that consumers' carbon tax burden will be less than the
benefit of the income tax cut. Finally, as explained in the third point,
consumers can change their behavior to further reduce the impact of the
carbon tax, coming out still further ahead.
These points should not be overstated. Although in this scenario the
average citizen comes out ahead, the citizenry is composed of both those
who use little carbon and those who use too much. While light users will
come out far ahead, heavy users will likely suffer, unless they can change
their conduct to reduce their carbon use or can find some method to pass
on some of their increased carbon costs. In addition, revenues will have
to be maintained, so greater than projected reductions in carbon use will
have to be made up by increasing the carbon tax. Thus, only those who
can reduce their carbon use faster than the norm will come out ahead
under the third mechanism. On the positive side, however, if a particular
business can reduce its carbon tax liability more than others in its
industry while matching competitors' prices and earning higher profits, it
7. For more information regarding hydrogen fuel and fuel cells see, e.g., Robert F.
Service, New Catalyst Marks Major Step in the March Toward Hydrogen Fuel, 321
Science 620 (2008), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/321/5889/
620 (discussing electrolysis to produce hydrogen); Bjorn Winther-Jensen, Orawan
Winther-Jensen, Maria Forsyth, & Douglas R. MacFarlane, High Rates of Oxygen
Reduction over a Vapor Phase-Polymerized PEDOT Electrode, 321 Science 671 (2008),
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/321/5889/671 (discussing fuel
cells); J. Garcia-Barriocanal et al., Colossal Ionic Conductivity at Interfaces of Epitaxial
ZrO2 :Y2 0 3/SrTiO 3 Heterostructures, 321 SCIENCE 676 (2008), available at http://www.
sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/321/5889/676 (discussing fuel cells).
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would have a substantial incentive to widen the gap between its carbon
use and that of the industry norm.
Along with the benefits discussed above, there is an additional
reason why a carbon tax is desirable. Taxes are necessary to provide
revenue to pay for government programs, but any tax has ill effects.
There will always be inefficiencies in collecting taxes. Taxpayers incur
costs to plan and comply with taxes, to avoid taxes, or perhaps to evade
taxes. Tax collectors incur costs to enforce taxes. Tribunals incur costs to
resolve disputes over taxes. These costs waste resources. In addition, any
tax distorts behavior, slowing economic activity by withdrawing funds
from the economy and reducing incentives to work, innovate, and take
risks. What is taxed may affect these harms. A tax on income, for
example, may reduce incentives for working, saving, and financial risk-
taking. A tax on consumption may reduce expenditures on food,
clothing, shelter, health care, and entertainment, which are some of the
main goals of human activity and should not be discouraged
unnecessarily. In contrast, a tax on carbon discourages carbon use, which
should have two major benefits. The first is the reduction of carbon
emissions that threaten to accelerate global warming. The second is the
value of carbon in its native form. Coal and petroleum can be the raw
materials for chemicals and medicines that can have great value to
society.8 To burn those raw materials unnecessarily is wasteful. We will,
of course, continue to tax incomes and consumption, but we must ask
how much higher to push the marginal tax on each, or how much of a tax
reduction on either to forgo, as opposed to imposing a tax on carbon.
While there are clear losses to society in discouraging either income or
consumption, it is hard to see a comparable loss to society from a
reduction in carbon usage.
The counterargument to the preceding paragraph is that carbon
consumption per se is not valuable, but energy is necessary to our
society, and much of that energy is likely to come primarily from
fossilized carbon for the foreseeable future. There are two responses to
this counterargument. First, the carbon tax should be gradually phased in,
so that there will be time to develop new sources of energy to replace
carbon. Second, we may simply have to live with less energy. Most
sources of energy have potential problems: nuclear reactors create
plutonium and other radioactive materials with long half-lives, risking
accidents or terrorism; bio-fuels seem to be driving up food prices;
hydroelectric power requires dams that harm fish and other wildlife and
that may fail catastrophically; windmills may endanger birds and bats,
8. HANS-GEORG ELIAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PLASTICS §3.1.1, at 31 (2d ed. 2003)
("The main raw material for [plastics] is petroleum ... Coal tar is the raw material for
aromatics such as benzene, toluene, and xylenes...").
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and some consider windmills to be visual pollution. However, to use less
energy need not mean a lower standard of living. Our society, our
machines, our homes, and our lives have evolved to their present state
only in the very recent past and in a world of very inexpensive energy.
With energy becoming more expensive, design and habits should change
as we learn to substitute more time, labor, material, and engineering for
some of the energy we now expend. The historic link between energy
consumed and quality of life need not control the future.
9
A carbon tax will merely speed up inevitable societal changes and
cause them to occur in a more orderly manner. The extent of the Earth's
fossil carbon resources is uncertain and although there are likely to be
further major discoveries, these resources are ultimately finite. World
economic growth is consuming them at accelerating rates. The recent
sudden rise in petroleum prices warns us of what might happen in the
future unless we smooth the transition to a less carbon-intensive world.
Finally, the carbon tax could be reduced or suspended during an
energy emergency, such as when normal supplies of energy are cutoff by
natural disasters, wars, or boycotts. The reduction or suspension could be
achieved by legislation, authority delegated to the executive, or
automatic triggers. However, one should remember that high prices
discourage consumption, and reduced consumption is an appropriate
response to energy supply disruption. Moreover, reduction or suspension
of the carbon tax will benefit both users and producers of carbon in
uncertain proportions. While one would hope that the suspension would
benefit the users, the suspension is also likely to benefit the producers to
some extent. To increase the producers' profits at a time when they are
already swollen by an emergency energy price increase does not seem to
be a wise policy.
On the other hand, to adjust the carbon tax to produce a steady rise
in carbon costs would promote efficient development of new
technologies. Too often in the past, sudden price increases have found
the substitute technology undeveloped or not yet deployed. Additionally,
sudden price decreases have frequently derailed development and
deployment of new technologies. 10 Under this approach, instead of
steadily increasing carbon taxes, Congress might provide for a steady
rise in the price of carbon, including the tax. Under this approach, the tax
9. See DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., ENERGY CONSUMPTION,
EXPENDITURES, AND EMISSIONS INDICATORS, 1949-2007 tbl. 1.5, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/aer/txt/ptb0105.html. (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) (indicating declining carbon
emissions per real dollar of GDP since 1980).
10. See Clifford Kraus, Alternative Energy Suddenly Faces Headwinds, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.con2008/10/21/business/21
energy.html?em.
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would rise less as carbon prices rose faster, and the carbon tax would rise
more when carbon prices were not rising. This smoothing might ease the
weaning from carbon dependence.
On balance, there should be enough winners from enacting a carbon
tax to make it worthwhile to explore how such a tax might operate.11 Part
II of this article outlines the mechanics of a carbon tax system. Part III
addresses the need to reduce the serious regressivity in consumption
taxes generally, including a carbon tax. Part IV discusses combining a
carbon tax with another kind of consumption tax, a Value Added Tax
("VAT"). Part V focuses on the international issues presented by a
carbon tax. Part VI considers the interrelationship of the carbon tax and
other social goals.
II. THE MECHANICS OF A CARBON TAx
In its simplest form, a carbon tax would be imposed on the
production of fossil carbon, whether by mining coal, pumping petroleum,
or extracting natural gas. The tax would not be based on the value of the
product or on its energy content, but solely on its carbon content. Coal
consists overwhelmingly of carbon, so all of the material removed would
be taxed. Natural gas consists largely of methane or CH4, in which each
molecule consists of one carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms, so only
a portion of the material removed would be taxed. Petroleum is a mixture
of hydrocarbon molecules that is intermediate between coal and natural
gas, with each petroleum molecule including both hydrogen and carbon
atoms, but with more carbon and less hydrogen than natural gas.
A carbon tax will resemble the gasoline taxes imposed by the
federal government and by state governments in the United States, but
with three major differences. The first arises in the point along the chain
from mining to ultimate consumption where the tax is imposed. The
carbon tax would be imposed at the point of extraction, the very start of
11. The winner of a political contest may be difficult to predict. That more people
would win from a carbon tax than would lose does not necessarily mean that the tax will
be enacted. Those fearing loss of what they now enjoy may be more highly motivated to
act than those expecting future uncertain and often broadly-shared gains. See generally
GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS (2001). The
losers may fear not just the extra costs they will bear under a carbon tax, but that those
costs will reduce the value of economic interests they now hold. For example, an increase
of $10,000 annually in the cost to heat and cool a house from a carbon tax is certainly a
problem, but an even greater problem would be a $100,000 drop in the value of that
house as prospective buyers capitalize those extra costs, and still greater a problem if the
house has a large mortgage so that the price drop takes much or all of the owner's equity.
This article does not predict that a carbon tax can be enacted; it only suggests that there is
a sufficient possibility that there is reason to proceed.
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that chain, when the coal, petroleum, or natural gas is first removed from
the ground, whereas the gasoline tax is imposed at the end of the chain
when it is sold to the consumer. The second difference is the breadth of
the taxes. The carbon tax would be imposed on all forms of carbon
extraction, and it would be applied regardless of end-use. Coal or
petroleum used to make plastics or fertilizer would be taxed, as would
coal or petroleum used for fuel. On the other hand, the gasoline tax
applies to gasoline, which is only a part of the spectrum of products
made from petroleum-and to a limited but perhaps growing extent
made from coal or natural gas-and only if the gasoline is to be used for
certain purposes. Gasoline taxes are imposed on gasoline to be used in
motor vehicles to pay for highways, on fuel for boats to protect and
improve inland waterways, and on fuel for aircraft to operate airports and
the air traffic control system. 12 Gasoline to be used for farm equipment
or to fuel cooking stoves, however, is normally exempt from the gasoline
tax. The third difference is in the use of the proceeds. Carbon tax revenue
could be used for general government purposes, while the gasoline tax
revenue is used only to build, maintain, and operate highways,
waterways, or airways.
At its core, a carbon tax is fairly simple because relatively few
entities control virtually all carbon production. Although particular
entities may own thousands of coal mines or petroleum or natural gas
wells, these entities tend to be relatively large and their extraction
activities have fixed locations at the source-unlike sellers or
transporters or manufacturers, whose locations may easily shift-which
simplifies the process of identifying them and collecting the carbon tax.
There are about 13,000 oil and natural gas extractors in the United States,
although the largest fifty control over seventy percent of both markets.
13
Thirty "major coal producers" control eighty-six percent of the U.S. coal
market.14 The tax need not be collected from other entities along the
chain of extraction, refining, manufacturing, distribution, and finally
consumption, because of two effects. First, the tax may cause a reduction
in carbon output, making less carbon available along the chain and thus
lowering carbon emissions. Second, the tax will be passed along the
12. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL30304, THE FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON
GASOLINE AND THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND: A SHORT HISTORY (Apr. 4, 2006), available
at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/06May/RL30304.pdf. The taxes are imposed by
26 U.S.C. § 4042 (inland waterways) and 26 U.S.C. § 4081 (motor and aviation).
13. See ETA, Operator Data by Size Class, Energy Information Administration,
2006 U.S. CRUDE OIL, NAT. GAS, & NAT. GAS LIQUIDS RESERVES ANN. REP. tbl A6,
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/natural-gas/datapublications/crude-
oil-naturalgasreserves/current/pdf/appa.pdf.
14. EIA, Major U.S. Coal Producers, 2007 EIA REP. No. 0584 tbl. 10, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/acr/table10.html.
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chain to a substantial extent, giving entities and individuals at all places
along the chain an incentive to reduce carbon consumption.
A carbon tax could be imposed later in the distribution chain, such
as when a consumer fills a car's tank with gasoline or pays electric or
heating bills, which would allow fine-tuning of the tax. For example, it
might be harder to find substitutes for carbon use in aircraft than in
trains, trucks, or automobiles, so there might be a lower carbon tax on
aircraft fuel. Such fine-tuning, if done as a matter of careful thought and
wisdom, might be desirable. However, fine-tuning of the carbon tax
might instead be the product of political power and logrolling. In
addition, to impose the carbon tax later in the distribution chain would be
much more complicated. Many of the benefits soughtby imposing the
carbon tax at a later point could be achieved through refundable credits
for carbon sequestration, discussed below.
Three other sources of carbon deserve brief mention. First,
diamonds are virtually pure carbon; however, because they are so
valuable, they are very rarely burned, and therefore do not pose a risk of
global warming. Second, the destruction of forests, which serve as major
"sinks" for C0 2 , is a major problem under any carbon emission control
system.15 While controlling carbon extraction through wells and mines
may be relatively simple because of the limited number of entities doing
such extraction, control of forest destruction may be more difficult
because timber poaching can be done in any forested area and by many
small-scale operations.16 Controlling tree cutting might best be done by
using more carrots than sticks. For example, the forests might be
operated on a sustainable multiple-use basis, providing incomes for
landowners and creating jobs for others through activities such as
logging and tree replanting, harvesting fruits and nuts that do not destroy
the tree, searching for valuable chemical and medicinal compounds, and
promoting tourism. The stick could be limits on importation of lumber
and wood products, similar to limits that have been imposed on
diamonds and ivory.
17
15. See, e.g., Science Daily, Destruction of Sumatra Forests Driving Global Climate
Change and Species Extinction, Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/02/080226193141 .htm.
16. See WWF, Forest Illegal Logging, http://www.panda.org/about-wwf/what-we_
do/forests/problems/forest illegal-logging/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
17. See, e.g., NICOLAS COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL3075 1, DIAMONDS AND
CONFLICT: BACKGROUND, POLICY, AND LEGISLATION (2003), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30751.pdf, Marc Kaufman, U.S. is Major
Market for Illegal Ivory, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2004, at A4, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45635-2004Sep23.html.
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Unfortunately, the carbon tax will increase the already great
pressure on the world's forests. As the fossil sources of fuel-coal,
petroleum, and natural gas-are subject to the carbon tax, the temptation
and pressure to cut wood for fuel will increase. This pressure will further
increase because building materials will be subject to the carbon tax
based on their content-if made of plastic or other carbon-based
materials---or on the carbon released in their production-if made of
steel or concrete-making wood structures comparatively more
attractive. Extra emphasis will be required on the carrots and sticks that
help to preserve the world's forests.
The third source of carbon is the process of making powdered
cement, used in creating concrete by adding such materials as water,
sand, and aggregate. Cement is made by heating raw materials, which
releases CO2.1 8 Typically the heating process requires use of carbon
fuels, and there is an additional release of carbon from the raw materials.
Because so much construction involves concrete or asphalt, and because
other alternatives are not apparent, construction may be among the most
difficult industries in which to reduce carbon emissions. In addition to
new alternatives, part of the solution to this problem will be to recycle
concrete19 and asphalt, and part will likely be carbon capture credits,
discussed below. The problem is probably somewhere between the easily
controlled mine and well situation, and the more problematic issue of
tree cutting. For example, a cement kiln requires high temperatures, but
one could probably be built fairly informally and on a small scale, and if
one were destroyed, a replacement might be built without much
difficulty. This means cement kilns would probably be harder to control
within the legal system than coal mines and petroleum or natural gas
wells. Cement kilns might be only slightly more complicated than illegal
alcohol distilleries used to make bootleg liquor, and thus almost as
difficult to control. On the other hand, it should be far easier to cut down
and haul away a few trees than to set up and operate a cement kiln.
A. Credits for Carbon Recapture
Another important aspect of carbon taxation would be the extent to
which credits should be allowed for carbon capture-i.e., for activities
that remove CO 2 from the atmosphere. For example, a coal-fired electric
18. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Cement Industry is at Center of Climate Change
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/
business/worldbusiness/26cement.html.
19. Rosenthal's statement, "Cement has no viable recycling potential; each new
road, each new building needs new cement," is true, but it overlooks the use of old
broken up concrete as aggregate.
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power plant would have indirectly paid a tax on the coal it consumed. It
could earn a refundable credit if it creates systems to capture the carbon
dioxide produced by burning the coal, rather than release the carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere. Ideally, such a credit should be allowed so
that the reduction in carbon use will be less drastic but net carbon
emissions will still significantly decline. Before the law authorizes such a
credit, there should be confidence that the carbon is in fact very likely to
be immobilized indefinitely.
There are various possible immobilization technologies. Carbon
dioxide might be trapped underground. Under high pressure, carbon
dioxide condenses from a gas to a liquid, and the liquid form is much
denser and less mobile than the gas, so it can be injected into porous rock
formations that are capped by non-porous rock-perhaps rock formations
from which natural gas or petroleum has been extracted.20 Because rock
formations have confined naturally occurring CO 2 and methane for
millions of years, they should be able to confine sequestered carbon.
Nevertheless, it will be necessary to determine which formations are
appropriate. A possible problem with this technology is that if the
mineral rights have been severed from the surface ownership-as has
occurred in many areas-it may be unclear to whom the rights to the
porous rock formation belong.
21
Another possible immobilization technology is to encourage algae
growth in the ocean. This would allow algae to soak up carbon dioxide
through the process of photosynthesis, which could be encouraged by
adding to the dissolved iron content of the surface waters. These algae
blooms, however, may block sunlight and absorb oxygen needed by
other wildlife. 22 This process may remove carbon dioxide indefinitely,
but this result would seem to be achieved only to the extent that the algae
20. Carbon dioxide injection has long been used to enhance recovery of petroleum
and natural gas. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Geologic Sequestration of
Carbon Dioxide, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/wells.sequestration.html. On July 15,
2008, the Environmental Protection Agency proposed rules on "Geologic Sequestration
of Carbon Dioxide" under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The proposed rules' focus on
safe drinking water is different from the concerns raised here. Press Release, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Lays Groundwork for Promising Technologies
to Help Mitigate Climate Change (July 15, 2008), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/d35b72
dfe481043b85257487005e47cd!OpenDocument.
21. Wyoming recently enacted a statute providing that ownership of subsurface pore
space belongs to the surface owner unless there has been an express severance. Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152 (2008). Oklahoma recognizes a similar right for surface owners in
regard to pore space. Ellis v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412, 421 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
22. See David Biello, Oceanic Dead Zones Continue to Spread, Sci. AM., Aug. 15,
2008, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfmid=oceanic-dead-zones-spread&sc =
WR_20080819.
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sinks to the bottom of the ocean-whether as algae or incorporated into
skeletons of wildlife higher up the food chain-and does not decay.
23
Forests recapture carbon through the process of photosynthesis, as
the trees combine carbon dioxide with water to produce cellulosic
compounds. Yet forests may be cut down, and forest fires are a normal
part of a forest's life cycle. Each of these events risks a return of the
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Only a large forest with limited
logging and at least moderate fire suppression is likely to be an effective
long-term "carbon sink." However, forests grown on a sustainable basis
for fuel use or carpentry would likely be exempt from the carbon tax.
Some products of petroleum could be considered so long-lived as to
qualify under a system of carbon capture. Asphalt for roads might be
such a use, as might some plastic products with long-lived uses. There is
a recent proposal to use CO2 to make calcium or magnesium carbonate
by bubbling the CO2 through seawater, then using the calcium carbonate
as aggregate in concrete that should last indefinitely. 24 Upon further
investigation, this proposal may be proven to be a satisfactory method of
recapturing carbon.
Ideally, there should be credits for carbon capture, if there are
appropriate technologies and the means to monitor and control them, and
if we can be confident that such technologies and means are effective.
B. Other Greenhouse Gases
Carbon dioxide is not the only greenhouse gas. Others include
methane, nitrous oxide, and some chlorofluorocarbons. 25 Their treatment
is beyond the scope of this article. It is possible-but by no means
certain-that steps similar to those proposed here for carbon may be
applicable to these other greenhouse gases. For example, both nitrous
oxide and chlorofluorocarbons are produced largely by industrial
processes that might be fairly easily taxed, but methane exists in large
23. " One of the largest sources of atmospheric carbon dioxide is through plant and
animal decay as microorganisms break down the dead material, releasing carbon
dioxide," Envtl. Literacy Council, Sources and Sinks, http://www.enviroliteracy.org/
article.php/439.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
24. David Biello, Cement from C0 2: A Concrete Cure for Global Warming? Sc.
AM., Aug. 7, 2008, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=cement-from-
carbon-dioxide.
25. Earth Sciences Research Laboratory, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,
Radiative Forcing of Climate by Non-CO2 Atmospheric Gases, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/
research/themes/forcing/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
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quantities in nature and is also produced by such widespread sources as
digestion by cattle, rice paddies, wetlands, and termite colonies.
26
C. Gradual Phase-In of the Carbon Tax
The carbon tax should be phased in over several years, with low
initial rates that slowly but substantially increase, to allow both
consumers and producers to adjust gradually to the new system. Old
energy-intensive personal and business investments will lose their value
under a system of carbon reduction. However, allowing time for the
change will permit the value of the old investments to be recovered
through depreciation because they will be used for a period not much
shorter than their normal useful life. That useful life, it may be noted,
will already be shortened by the increasing prices of energy, which will
in many cases make old investments economically impractical well
before their physical useful lives are exhausted. As a matter of both
politics and equity, it would be unwise to impose windfall losses
unnecessarily. The mirror image of phasing out the old is developing and
implementing the new. It will take time to develop and create the ability
to mass produce new energy-efficient products and processes, and one
would not want unnecessarily large and sudden windfall gains to those
who own such assets. A carbon tax enacted with low initial rates, but
with steady and eventually substantial rate increases, would allow a
smooth and fair transition from our current system to one much less
carbon-intensive.
27
Even after an initial phase-in, carbon tax rates should continue to
rise to promote further reductions in carbon emissions. Ultimately, these
rates may be expected to become high enough to virtually eliminate net
carbon emissions, so that the current high levels of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere can begin to return to normal. Thus, ideally the carbon tax
yield eventually will decline, even though the rates will have become
quite high, because net carbon emissions will have been reduced
significantly. 2
8
26. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Methane, Sources and Emissions,
http://www.epa.gov/methane/sources.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
27. See discussion supra note 10, suggesting a goal of a steady rise in the price of
carbon including the tax, as opposed to a steady increase in the tax itself.
28. If raised beyond a certain point, tax rates are likely to reduce tax revenue by
providing a disincentive to work or invest. See, e.g., Economyprofessor.com, Laffer
Curve, http://www.economyprofessor.com/economictheories/laffer-curve.php (last
visited Nov. 11, 2008). However, in the context of a carbon tax, an increasingly higher
tax rate provides not a disincentive to work, but a disincentive to emit carbon. A primary
purpose of a carbon tax is to reduce carbon emissions, not merely to raise revenue, and so
diminishing returns over time are desirable. See Arthur B. Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past,
2008]
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y
1II. REGRESSIVITY UNDER A CARBON TAx
In many ways, a carbon tax will resemble a tax on consumption, and
thus it will be regressive. Carbon is included in the creation,
manufacture, distribution, or use of virtually all products. Clothing is
often made from synthetics, which are often made from petroleum. The
same is true for the plastics used in everything from cars to kitchen
utensils and from aircraft components to surgical instruments. Other
products containing little carbon may nonetheless require a significant
amount of carbon in their creation. Steel, for example, is basically iron
with small amounts of alloying metals and carbon, but its production
typically requires large amounts of carbon to remove the oxygen from
the iron oxide ores in which iron is normally found. Carbon-based fuels
are used to transport many products vast distances along the chain from
extraction to end-use consumption. In addition, the operation of many
products-such as cars, furnaces, air conditioners, and stoves-requires
energy normally derived from carbon. Of course, some individual
lifestyles are more carbon-intensive than are others, but individuals
generally use many products and services that employ carbon, so the
carbon tax will resemble a tax on consumption generally.
A consumption tax is usually regressive; that is, it takes a higher
percentage of low incomes than of high incomes, for the following
reasons. Persons of low income tend to do little saving and spend nearly
all of their incomes on consumption because they have few extra
resources to buy anything beyond food, clothing, shelter, health care, and
other necessities. Persons of low income may even consume more than
their incomes, as they spend all their past savings and borrow against
future income from sources such as credit cards, payday lenders, and
loan sharks. Thus, persons of low income may pay a consumption tax on
amounts approaching or even exceeding their incomes. Persons of
increasingly high incomes, in contrast, may be able to invest or save
increasing portions of their incomes, thus leaving decreasing portions of
their incomes to be consumed and thus subject to the consumption tax.
29
Present, and Future, 1765 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage
Foundation, D.C.), June 1, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/bg1765.cfm.
29. The problem of regressive consumption taxes may be particularly acute for
carbon taxes. Carbon taxes may make commuting much more expensive so that those of
higher incomes who have fled to suburbia in the past will find it to be in their interest to
return to central cities to reduce their commuting costs, outbidding and thus displacing
the lower income residents of the central cities, forcing those low income people to move
to the suburbs and thus incur expensive commutes. See, e.g., France's Suburbs: Two
Years On, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2007 (discussing economic depression and unrest in
France's low income suburbs).
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The United States does not have a steeply progressive tax system.
The top income tax bracket now is thirty-five percent, far below the
above ninety percent rates reached in World War II and the post-War
period, the seventy percent rate of the late 1960s and the 1970s, and the
fifty percent rate in the early 1980s. 30 To shift from a mild progression to
the regression of a consumption tax would seem unwise, particularly in
light of the increasing inequality of income and wealth that has been
developing over the past generation.31 One might consider three possible
approaches to reducing the regressivity of a consumption tax: (1) an
exemption from the tax on items likely to be heavily used by the poor;
(2) a provision of economic transfers to those of low income; and (3) an
implementation of other taxes that are progressive so that the tax
system-although it includes a regressive consumption tax-is
progressive on the whole.
A. Exempt Certain Consumption
One way to reduce the regressivity of a consumption tax is to
exempt items such as food or health care. The food exemption, however,
may be unwise, and the health care exemption may be better explained as
"not consumption" rather than "regression reduction."
In the case of a food exemption, persons of lower incomes may be
expected to use more of their incomes for food than do those of higher
incomes, so that exempting food may tend to reduce regression.
However, this solution is very expensive. One would expect that most
food is consumed by those of middle and higher incomes, who buy
increasingly more expensive foods as incomes rise. Each of these higher-
income individuals is likely to spend more on food than does a person of
lower income. Consequently, exempting this food does little to reduce
regression. Because so much revenue is lost due to the food exemption,
the rates on other consumption must be higher. As the tax rate rises, it
increasingly distorts normal economic activities and personal choices,
and increases the incentive to avoid or evade the tax.32
Not taxing health care may be justified by an acknowledgement that
health care differs from other consumption. A person who spends more
on food, clothing, shelter, or travel is generally thought to be better off
30. JOSEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 313-14 tbl.A-1 (5th ed. 1987).
31. CHYE-CHING HUANG & CHAD STONE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
AVERAGE INCOME IN 2006 UP $60,000 FOR TOP 1 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS, JUST $430 FOR
BoTroM 90%: INCOME CONCENTRATION AT HIGHEST LEVEL SINCE 1928, NEW ANALYSIS
SHOWS, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.cbpp.org/3-2-08tax2.htm.
32. See generally JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 114-56 (3rd ed.
2004).
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than those who spend less. A person who spends more on health care,
however, is probably less well-off than someone with a similar income
but lower expenditures for health care.
33
Thus, it does not seem to be a wise policy to exempt food from a
consumption tax, but it may be wise to exempt health care. For the
carbon tax imposed at the point of extraction, however, it is probably not
possible to exempt particular types of expenditures. Even if it were
possible, while many medicines are made or processed in part using
carbon-derived raw materials or fuels, the carbon content is typically
such a low proportion of the cost of medicine or other health care that no
exemption should be needed.
More generally, the danger of targeted exemptions surfaces in the
process of political prioritization and cost-benefit analysis. Some believe
that certain activities are beneficial and so should be more lightly taxed,
and that other activities--or the same activities with an opposing
spokesperson-are harmful and should be more heavily taxed. These
ideas may have merit; however, it is very hard to determine benefit and
harm. Even if they are determined, it is difficult to define them in
reasonably administrable ways, and the process of so doing is likely to
yield a complicated system. The mind-numbing complexity of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code stands as a warning against the dangers of
straying from general principles to particularized rules, and of using the
tax system to reward the beneficial and restrain the harmful. Ultimately,
practical politics may introduce such complexity, but in theory that
complexity should be avoided or at least minimized.
B. A System of Financial Transfers
The regressivity of consumption taxes may be offset by a system of
payments to those of lower incomes. For example, the tax that finances
Social Security is regressive, because it only applies to wages and self-
employment income-not to the dividends and interest, rent and
royalties, and capital gains more likely to be enjoyed by those of higher
incomes-and only up to a certain annual amount (annual salary of
$106,800 in 2009). The Earned Income Credit, although now a major
wealth transfer and anti-poverty program, was initially enacted to refund
33. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REv. 309, 335-36 (1972) (arguing that "[w]hat distinguishes medical expenses
from other personal expenses at bottom is a sense that large differences in their
magnitude between people in otherwise similar circumstances are apt to reflect
differences in need rather than choices among gratifications").
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this regressive tax to persons of low income. 34 A federal consumption
tax, such as the carbon tax proposed here, might be made less regressive
by a similar system of transfer payments.
35
It should be noted that a carbon tax with a transfer payment to those
of low incomes would still provide an incentive for low-income persons
to reduce their carbon use. Because the transfer would be based on
income, not carbon use, the recipient could keep more of the transfer
payment by reducing carbon use. In contrast, an exemption of items
heavily used by the poor would provide no such incentive to low income
people to reduce carbon consumption, and thus would conflict with one
of the major goals of the carbon tax: encouraging all to reduce their
carbon consumption.
A system of transfer payments may be expensive to administer in
order to get the payments to the right people without too much
paperwork and inconvenience, while at the same time minimizing
mistakes and the opportunity for fraud. This cost might be hard to justify,
given the relatively small amounts of revenue to be collected by a carbon
tax, at least initially. Such a transfer payment system may be justified,
however, as part of the tax system as a whole. The next section discusses
how the United States might improve its tax system by replacing the
lower income tax brackets with a Value Added Tax ("VAT"). This VAT
will allow transfer payments to offset the regressive effects of a carbon
tax and will permit adjustments between carbon taxation and other
taxation, as the carbon tax first increases revenue as rates rise, then yields
less revenue as carbon use falls.
C. The Carbon Tax in the Larger Tax System
A progressive tax system may include regressive elements. The
regression of a consumption tax such as the carbon tax proposed here
may be offset at least in part if the tax system also includes progressive
elements, such as a progressive income tax. This section discusses how a
carbon tax would fit into the entire tax system.
A tax system may have several components. Income may be taxed
to individuals, to entities such as trusts or corporations, or under
specialized taxes such as those on wages and self-employment income to
fund Social Security. Property is commonly taxed in the United States by
local governments. States and local governments tax consumption under
34. JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 155-56 (Urban Institute
Press 2006).
35. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 32, at 258.
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general sales taxes (most other nations use VATs).36 Specialized
consumption taxes include the "sin taxes" on alcohol and tobacco and the
taxes on vehicle fuels that are, in effect, user fees that pay to build and
maintain highway systems.
As suggested by Professor Michael Graetz of the Yale Law School,
the United States might replace its largely income-tax-based tax system
with a combination of income tax and VAT, the norm in most other
industrialized nations. 37 Under such a combined income tax and VAT
system, the VAT might be considered the lowest tax bracket of the
income tax system. For example, a broad-based fifteen percent VAT
could serve as the equivalent of the fifteen percent income tax bracket.38
Then all income tax brackets at or below fifteen percent could be
eliminated-so that people currently in those marginal income tax
brackets would no longer be required to file income tax returns-and
income tax brackets above fifteen percent could be reduced by fifteen
percent. For example, the current top bracket of thirty-five percent would
then be twenty percent. This change would have several desirable effects,
in addition to being a part of implementing a carbon tax.
Supplementing the income tax with a VAT would reduce the
benefits of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax preferences. Income
successfully shielded from the income tax would still be potentially
subject to the VAT, and vice versa-income spent in ways not subject to
the VAT may still be subject to the income tax.
Although the slowing that taxes impose on an economy may be
measured by the total amount of taxes in comparison with the size of the
economy, many of the distortions and disincentives that taxes impose are
based on the marginal tax rate. The policy to reduce distortion was at the
36. A VAT resembles a sales tax, in that it raises the price of consumption to the
ultimate consumer. Where a sales tax is imposed only on the ultimate retail sale to the
consumer, the VAT is collected at each stage of the production and distribution process,
from mine to factory to wholesaler to retailer, with each step allowed a credit for the
VAT already paid in regard to the product. For example, with a 10% VAT, a mine would
pay a $2 VAT on $20 sale of mined material. The smelter would owe a $3 VAT on a $30
sale of that refined material, but would have a credit for the $2 already paid, and thus pay
only $1 more. The factory selling its product for $80 would be liable for a VAT of $8, but
with the credit for $3 already paid would have to pay only $5 more. When the retailer
sold the product for $100, the VAT liability would be $10, but with the $8 credit for the
VAT already paid would remit only $2. Taxing all units in the chain under a VAT makes
evasion more difficult, an important concern with the relatively high rates at which VATs
are applied, compared to sales taxes.
37. MICHAEL GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS 64-67 (Yale University
Press 2008).
38. This discussion is somewhat over-simplified, because a 1% income tax is not
the same as a 1% VAT, because the income tax base and the VAT tax base differ. This
oversimplification however is sufficient for the purpose of making this point.
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heart of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which kept total revenues roughly
constant but dramatically reduced the highest marginal tax rate from fifty
percent to twenty-eight percent.39 Replacing a part of the income tax
with a VAT would allow a reduction in marginal income tax rates and
thus reduce distortions and disincentives.
The United States currently has a complex array of tax provisions to
encourage saving; these provisions include the favorable treatment of
long-term capital gains and retirement saving through employer
pensions, self-directed pensions, and IRAs. 40 A consumption tax, such as
a carbon tax, directly and simply encourages saving by not taxing
savings until the savings and their yield ultimately are consumed.
It is unclear whom the income tax burdens, highlighting another
problem with an exclusively income-based tax system.41 Ideally, the tax
incidence would be on the income earner, so that distortion would be
minimal. However, it may be that income taxes could be shifted to some
extent. In particular, the corporate income tax may operate like other
costs, thus reducing profits, but the business would prefer either to
reduce costs or to boost prices in order to maintain profits. To the extent
that the tax results in increased prices, it may operate like a sales or
consumption tax. To the extent that the tax results in decreased costs, it
may operate like a wage tax because wages are a large component of
costs in most businesses. To the extent that the tax neither increases
prices nor decreases wages, it may reduce the return to capital generally.
This issue of tax incidence may cause problems in international
trade, when U.S. corporations that operate in the U.S. income-tax-only
regime compete with foreign corporations operating in their nation's
income-tax-and-VAT regime. Goods imported to the United States will
bear no part of the foreign nation's VAT, because the VAT is rebated on
exports, but they will compete with U.S. products that may include some
U.S. income tax burdens. Goods exported by the United States may have
some part of the U.S. corporate income tax built-in, but the goods will
still be fully subject to the foreign nation's VAT. The large foreign trade
deficit of the United States might be reduced if part of the U.S. tax
system switched from the income tax to the VAT. Generally, a switch to
the VAT may smooth international trade because then the trading
countries would have similar tax systems, rather than the United States
being the only major commercial power without a VAT.
39. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 104 (Oct. 22, 1986).
40. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (Long term capital gains); 26 U.S.C. § 401(employer and self-
directed pensions): 26 U.S.C. §§ 408-408A (Individual Retirement Accounts).
41. See generally Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income
Tax, 61 NAT'L.TAX J. 303 (2008).
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A combined income tax and VAT system can still be progressive.
Lower-income progressivity may be maintained by the transfer payments
discussed above. For much of the middle class, consumption is
proportional to income, so as far as progression goes there may be little
difference between an income tax and a VAT. For those of high income
whose rates of consumption may significantly drop as a percentage of
rising incomes, progressivity cannot be obtained solely through a
consumption tax; there must also be a progressive income tax and
perhaps a tax on large gifts, estates, and inheritances.
42
IV. A VAT AND A CARBON TAx
The first step in implementing a carbon tax is to replace the lowest
income tax bracket(s) with a VAT. The second step is to replace a part of
the VAT with a carbon tax in which the carbon tax rates start low but rise
and the VAT rates start high but fall. This approach may appear
complicated, but the following paragraphs will show why a VAT is a
sensible companion to the income tax, and why a VAT will ease
implementation of a carbon tax.
43
Professor Graetz proposes a VAT rate between ten and fourteen
percent, and estimates that at ten percent, the VAT would yield between
$735 billion and $850 billion in 2008.44 The suggestion here is that some
portion of the projected VAT collections should instead be carbon tax
collections. The United States is estimated to emit approximately 6
billion tons of carbon dioxide annually.45 Thus, a ten percent VAT is
equivalent to a carbon dioxide tax of $120 to $150 per ton,46 or a carbon
tax of $450 to $550 per ton.47 Of course, a tax that high would be
prohibitive. The run-up in energy prices in 2008 has increased the price
42. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 32, at 52-53.
43. For a somewhat similar carbon tax proposal, but without the VAT, see Gilbert
Metcalf, Designing a Carbon Tax To Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14375, 2008), available at http://www.
nber.org/paperss/w14375.
44. GRAETZ, supra note 37, at 216.
45. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by
Gas, http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/facts and_figures/usemissions/
usghgemgas.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
46. The product of $120 and six billion is $720 billion; the product of $150 and six
billion is $900 billion.
47. Carbon dioxide has the chemical symbol CO2. Because carbon has an atomic
weight of 12 and oxygen has an atomic weight of 16, the total atomic weight of a CO 2
molecule is 44. A tax on CO 2 must be multiplied by 44/12 to determine the tax equivalent
if carbon alone is taxed rather than CO 2.
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of coal futures to over $120 per ton.48 It is hard to see how the carbon tax
could start any higher than $20 to $25 per ton-thus replacing roughly
one-half of one percent of the ten percentage points of the VAT-
without causing too much economic dislocation and political resistance,
and perhaps an even lower initial figure would be appropriate. That
initial rate would be increased over time.
The VAT is necessary for the carbon tax because the carbon tax is
regressive and will therefore require a system of transfer payments to
persons of low income. Initially the collection from the carbon tax will
be too small to justify the administrative costs of setting up and operating
such a system of transfer payments, but VAT collections will be high
enough to fund the transfer payment system. The VAT is also necessary
to mesh the regular tax system with the carbon tax. Initially, the carbon
tax rates-and hence carbon tax collections-should steadily increase; if
total revenues are to remain constant, other taxes must be reduced. It
should be easier to have periodic changes in VAT rates than in income
tax rates because income tax rates have a major impact on long-lived
economic investments, where the normal economic risks are best not
complicated by risks of varying tax rates. Although the carbon tax rates
will continue to increase, carbon tax collections will eventually decline
as net carbon use is reduced, thus requiring VAT rates to go back up to
maintain revenue neutrality.
The similarities between carbon taxes and VATs should not be
overstated. Although a VAT and a carbon tax both generally affect
consumption, a carbon tax will disproportionately impact those who use
more carbon. Some individuals or regions may have a greater need for
heating or cooling, 49 transportation, plastics and textiles made from
carbon, and so on. In general, however, greater efficiencies and new
techniques should minimize these unusual costs, and our highly
integrated economy suggests that the costs are likely to be broadly
shared. For example, if the costs of rural ranching and farming rise
because of carbon taxes, those costs should in large part be passed on to
the consumers of the farm and animal products. If we are to reduce
carbon emissions, it may be that we also must have fewer individuals
working in occupations and living in regions with higher carbon
consumption. Phasing in the carbon tax will reduce disruption in these
regions as well.
48. Kris Maher, Coal Producers Struggle to Meet Demand, WALL ST. J., June 24,
2008, at A4.
49. EIA, 2006 U.S. COAL CONSUMPTION BY END USE SECTOR, BY CENSUS DIVISION
AND STATE tbl 26, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coaVpage/acr/table26.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (showing energy (coal) use for heating/cooling by region).
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Of course, reducing carbon emissions will be disadvantageous to
those in the business of producing or using carbon. Although unfortunate
for those affected, that disadvantage is inevitable if we are to do
something about carbon emissions. To say that carbon extraction and
usage will become less advantageous does not mean that the businesses
so occupied, and their workers, must be rendered unemployable. They
may modify their activities by producing energy from renewable sources,
distributing that energy and its products, sequestering carbon, and so
forth. One might fairly generalize that much of current engineering has
evolved in an era of relatively inexpensive energy, and so has focused
more on labor, materials, and manufacturing costs. As energy costs rise,
engineers will weigh such factors of cost and productivity differently. So
long as the rise in energy cost is phased in, there should be minimal
disruption in the transition. Producing more efficient homes, equipment,
and the like should keep the economy humming.
V. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
Unlike some forms of air, water, and soil pollution that primarily
impact those nearby, the risk from carbon emissions is felt worldwide.
Thus, controlling carbon emissions requires worldwide cooperation, a
fact that has major consequences.
50
First one must ask: Where should the carbon tax be imposed: in the
nation where the carbon is emitted, or in the nation where the product of
the carbon emission is consumed? To avoid serious economic disruption,
the tax belongs where the consumption occurs, as the next questions
demonstrate: Could a manufacturer in a carbon-taxing jurisdiction
maintain its foreign sales if its competitors from other nations were not
required to pay carbon taxes? Could that manufacturer maintain its sales
within its home nation if imports from other nations were not subject to a
carbon tax? The answer to both questions is no. Therefore, a carbon tax
must apply much as a VAT does,51 with a remitted tax on exports and a
full tax on imports.
To impose the carbon tax on the carbon content of imports, and to
rebate it on the carbon content of exports, is probably permissible under
the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the General Agreement on
50. A number of nations have imposed something like a carbon tax, but none has
the broad carbon tax proposed here. See Christina Harper, Climate Change and Tax
Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 433-43 (2007).
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Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), and similar tax and trade treaties. Thus,
rebates of VAT on exports are permitted as is an imposition of the VAT
on imports. The problem is the carbon that is consumed in the process of
manufacturing but is not incorporated in the finished product, such as the
carbon used in the manufacturing of steel. GATT appears to allow
consideration of only the contents of the product and not the process of
producing a product.52 GATT and other treaties should be amended to
allow such taxes and rebates as part of the replacement for the Kyoto
Protocol. That replacement should go beyond merely allowing carbon
taxes; it should affirmatively encourage or even require them.
To require treaty signatories to impose regulations, as the Kyoto
Protocol does, may not be effective because political pressure at home is
likely to be heavily against regulation that harms domestic businesses
and does not respond to a clearly and broadly perceived domestic threat.
To require signatories to impose a carbon tax will at least offer the home
government a carrot-it presumably needs the revenue the tax would
raise, and it could gain political support by reducing other taxes-to
accompany the stick of duty to comply with treaty obligations. Fully
rebating the carbon tax on exports and imposing it on imports-helping
both domestic businesses and workers-should increase the political
acceptance of the carbon tax.
Unfortunately, much of the developing world subsidizes fuel costs
and thus subsidizes carbon emissions, rather than adopting policies to
reduce carbon emissions.53 The shift from subsidizing to taxing carbon
emissions must be gradual to reduce the strain on the citizens and reduce
the risk of electoral defeat or even riots and government overthrow. One
would hope that developing nations and their citizens could be persuaded
that, while an energy-intensive infrastructure could be copied relatively
quickly and cheaply from more developed nations with older economies,
52. See Joost Pauwelyn, US. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness
Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl.
Pol'y Solutions, Duke University, Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/intemationaltradelaw.pdf; see also Cinnamon
Carlame, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions Between Free Trade
and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 45, 53-56, 71-72
(2006).
53. See Fuel Subsidies: Crude Measures, ECONOMIST, May 29, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfin?story-id=11453151. Similarly, the
U.S. has various tax provisions favorable to the extractive industries, including the
extraction of fossil carbon. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 263(a)(1)(a), (c) (both allow the
deduction of what otherwise would likely to be non-deductible capital expenditures), and
Section 613 [limited by 613A] (allowing percentage depletion). Such provisions should
be made inapplicable to the fossil carbon extractive industries, probably best phased-in
over a period of years, with the existing investments subject to some form of
grandfathering protection.
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the infrastructure being built now will endure far into the future. To start
building a highly energy-intensive infrastructure now would be very
unwise, because energy is very likely to continue to become increasingly
expensive. One would hope that the citizens would begin to believe that
it would be better to build now the lean-energy infrastructure that the
future demands.
What can be done about excessive carbon use that is little related to
other markets? Suppose that a nation uses domestically produced carbon
to desalinate water for local consumption, or that it subsidizes fuel for
domestic heating and cooling, hot water, and local transportation. This
may be one of the problems that are most difficult to control, and a
failure to control it might have to be accepted. However, the collective
disapproval of the rest of the world, supported by trade sanctions, might
be enough to induce a gradual cessation of such subsidies, with a gradual
phasing-in of a carbon tax. Furthermore, a nation using local carbon to
produce exports would be limited if other nations imposed carbon taxes
on imports, as suggested above.
The carbon content of imports may be quite extensive. It includes
not just the physical carbon content of the item imported, but also the
carbon used to find, extract, and transport raw materials, to transport the
products of intermediate steps in production, to transport the finished
products to their ultimate destinations, and the carbon consumed in the
processes of smelting and manufacturing. Should one include the carbon
use of the inhabitants working to make the exports? The needed rebate of
carbon taxes on exports would be similarly complex. Presumably, similar
rules would be applied to both imports and exports, so that a nation
seeking a possible benefit in regard to one would incur costs and losses
in regard to the other. Such detailed inquiries and computations might be
avoided for trade between nations having similar carbon taxes.
A related problem is determining the carbon content of imports. To
use data on the actual carbon content may be difficult because such
information may not exist. Yet to presume that the imports have the same
carbon content as domestic manufacture is probably unrealistic because
the domestic carbon tax will have encouraged efficiency among domestic
manufacturers, an efficiency unlikely to be found among manufacturers
not subject to a carbon tax. Perhaps international data would be available
to provide a rough measure of each nation's carbon use per unit of
economic output, and the ratio of the exporting nation's carbon use to the
importing nation's carbon use could be applied to the measured carbon
[Vol. 20:1
Why and How to Tax Carbon
use by the importing nation in producing an equivalent product, based on
data that would be required to rebate the carbon tax on exports.54
VI. AVOIDING THE CREATION OF OTHER PROBLEMS
WHEN IMPOSING A CARBON TAX
While trying to solve the carbon problem, we must be careful not to
create other problems. Alternative sources of energy may affect the
environment in unforeseen ways, such as endangering animal habitats,
and the risks must be weighed with the possible benefits. Thus, the
carbon tax may need to be accompanied by other energy taxes or
regulation.
Nuclear fission produces energy without releasing carbon, but it
may present other risks. It is not clear that we have solved the problem of
long-term storage of the highly radioactive and long-lived products of
nuclear reactors.55 Furthermore, it is not clear that the risk of terrorists
using nuclear reactors-whether by stealing enriched uranium or
plutonium for a fission bomb, stealing radioactive by-products for a dirty
bomb, or crashing a truck or airplane into a reactor-has been resolved.
56
The push for biofuels competes with people's need for food, either
because the biofuel is made from food stocks, or because the biofuel
requires land, water, and labor that would otherwise produce food.57
Hydroelectric power normally requires damming rivers. Those dams
and reservoirs may endanger wildlife that otherwise would inhabit,
reproduce in, or migrate via the rivers, streams, and wetlands changed by
the dams.58 The dams may be vulnerable to catastrophic failure,
54. For example, international data might suggest that exporting and non-carbon-
taxing Nation X emits 150% as much CO 2 per units of economic output as does
importing and carbon-taxing Nation Y. If a car produced in Nation Y is shown to require
emitting six tons of CO 2, cars imported from Nation X might be taxed as though they
required 150% of six tons, or nine tons of CO 2.
55. U. S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N BACKGROUNDER ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE (2007),
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/radwaste.html.
56. See CARL BEHRENS & MARK HOLT, CONG. REPORTING SERVICE, RS21131,
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: VULNERABILITY TO TERRORIST ATTACK (Feb. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/rs21131.pdf.
57. VALERIE MERCER-BLACKMAN ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, IMF SURVEY:
BIOFUEL DEMAND PUSHES UP FOOD PRICES (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.imf.org/extemal/
pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/RES 1017A.htm; James Kanter, Europeans Reconsider Biofuel
Goal, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/
business/worldbusiness/08fiel.html.
58. ENVTL. ENCYCLOPEDIA 249 (William P. Cunningham et. al. eds., 2d ed. 1998)
(environmental effect of dams); EnviroHub.net, Hydroelectric Energy, http://www.
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unleashing devastating floods on those downstream; this risk might be
increased by terrorists.
Using the wind to generate electricity appears benign, but large
wind turbines may disrupt the migration of birds, bats, or insects, and
present a risk of harm to the ecological system.59 On the other hand,
although we have no studies to back up this surmise, wind turbines may
have beneficial impacts. Turbines slow and perhaps cool the wind as they
extract energy from it. If the wind is slower and potentially cooler, it will
probably drop more snow in the winter, as occurs at the snow fences
common in the U.S. Mountain West.60 A slower and cooler wind will
probably also reduce evaporation. The sum of these two effects could be
more soil moisture, although it is unclear whether the impact would
significantly improve crops or range land. These possible benefits must
be balanced against risks of harm.
Using tides and currents in the oceans to generate electricity appears
similarly benign, but here too there may be risks to birds, fish, insects,
and other sea creatures. 61 On the other hand, slowing the tide and current
may reduce beach erosion and even offer some protection against storm
surges or tsunamis. These possible benefits must also be balanced against
risks of harm.
envirohub.net/hydroelectric-energy.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
59. See generally David Biello, On a Wing and Low Air: The Surprising Way Wind
Turbines Kill Bats, ScI. AM., Aug. 26, 2008, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.
cfm?id=wind-turbines-kill-bats&sc=WR_20080902; WALLACE P. ERICKSON ET AL.,
NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COMM., AVIAN COLLISIONS WITH WIND TURBINES (Aug.
2001), http://www.west-inc.com/reports/avian-collisions.pdf, NAT'L WIND
COORDINATING COMM., WIND TURBINE INTERACTIONS WITH BIRDS AND BATS (Nov. 2004),
http://www.nationalwind.org/publications/wildlife/wildlife-factsheet.pdf, GREGORY D.
JOHNSON ET. AL., WESTERN ECOSYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, INC., AVIAN MONITORING
STUDIES AT THE BUFFALO RIDGE, MINNESOTA WIND-RESOURCE AREA: RESULTS OF A 4-
YEAR STUDY (2000), http://www.west-inc.com/reports/avian-buffalo -ridge.pdf; CAL.
ENERGY COMM'N 2000, CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES FOR REDUCING IMPACTS TO BIRDS AND
BATS FROM WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT (2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007
publications/CEC-700-2007-008/CEC-700-2007-008-CMFM1NUS_AP-E.PDF; John
Ritter, Wind Turbines Taking Toll on Birds of Prey, USA Today, Jan. 1, 2005, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-01-04-windmills-usatx.htm.
60. Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, University of Colorado,
http://culter.colorado.edu/Niwot/NiwotRidge-LTERsnowfence4.html (last visited Dec.
19, 2008). Snow fence in operation near the Continental Divide in Colorado. In this
experiment, the snow bank created by the snow fence is as high as the fence is, and the
width of the snow bank is twenty times the fence's height. However, latitude, elevation,
and precipitation might affect a snow fence.
61. See, e.g., Generating Electricity from Tidal Power, U. K. Env't Agency, http://
www.environment-agency.gov.uk/aboutus/512398/289428/930386/?lang _e (last visited
Nov. 11, 2008).
[Vol. 20:1
Why and How to Tax Carbon
Using the sun to generate electricity or to heat water or living space
appears benign, but one should be alert to possible ill effects, both in
current planning and as the use of solar energy expands.
In light of the concerns outlined in the preceding paragraphs, it may
be necessary to impose some tax or regulation on energy-generating
technologies that compete with carbon in order to reduce the risk of
serious problems in other areas caused by the drop in carbon use. The
time to examine these possibilities is before the carbon tax is enacted, not
after the tax has been implemented and caused harmful side effects.
VII. CONCLUSION
One might ask what the lean-energy future will be. It may look
something like this:
Compared to the United States today, homes will be smaller, so less
energy will be used in building, heating, cooling, and lighting them.
Homes will be closer together, so the next unit may reduce unwanted
loss of heating or cooling. Homes will be mixed with workplaces and
shopping places, so that commutes will be shorter and walking, bicycling
and public transportation will be more practical, with much less time
spent in traffic jams. Building these denser cities will be good for the
construction industry, although there may be more rehabilitation and in-
fill than new construction and development. Personal and business
activities will be more localized, so less energy will be consumed in
commuting and transportation.
Industrial processes will be more energy efficient. By analogy,
Israel, with limited water, has become quite water-efficient, 62 while the
United States, with abundant water, is very water-inefficient. One may
expect U.S. energy efficiency to follow a path similar to Israel's water
efficiency path as energy becomes scarcer and more costly. Americans
will have fewer things-so less energy will be consumed in making and
transporting them-because we will have less space to fill with them.
However, the things we do have may be of superior quality. For instance,
some suggest that Europeans tend to have fewer clothes than do
Americans, but European clothes are of a higher style and quality.
63
62. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel's Water Economy: Thinking of Future
Generations (Aug. 10, 2002), http://ww-w.mfa.gov.iU/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/
2002/8/Israel-s%2OWatero2OEconomy/o20-%20Thinking%2Oof%20future%20genera.
63. MSN Encarta, United States Culture: Ways of Life: Dress, http://encarta.msn.
com/encyclopedia_1741500820_2/UnitedStatesCulture.html (last visited Nov. 11,
2008).
2008]
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y
The energy extractive industries will likely shrink because the
carbon tax will reduce demand. There will likely be a similar decrease in
other extractive industries, such as metals and stone, because there will
be less energy to extract, smelt, manufacture, and transport them. This
will reduce the strain that humans impose on the environment.
Agriculture now is very carbon intensive because fertilizers and
pesticides are made from petroleum and substantial amounts of diesel
fuel are needed to move tractors repeatedly across the field to plow,
plant, apply fertilizer or pesticides, and harvest. But with less carbon
available at higher costs, less carbon-intensive methods will be
necessary. 64 Increased costs of transportation will result in more
agricultural products being consumed closer to where they are produced.
World trade, travel, and globalization will be reduced as energy
prices rise and carbon taxes are imposed.65 In some regards, that
reduction is truly a loss, not just of trade in goods, but also of trade in
ideas, such as health care, science, literature, and ultimately,
understanding. That loss may be a necessary one, however, dictated by
energy scarcity and the need to reduce carbon emissions. Fortunately,
much trade and exchange of ideas can be digital, which does not require
physical transportation. Further, reductions in physical transportation
may be in the public interest. Less transport of people should reduce the
risk of epidemics, or at least slow their spread and thus allow more time
to develop countermeasures. 66 Less transportation should reduce the
problems caused by invasive species. 67 Finally, less transportation of
components and products should reduce the risk that a few large factories
will provide all of the world's needs for particular items, such that a fire,
64. David Elstein, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, No-Till Farming Can Decrease
"Global Warming Potential, "Aug. 31, 2004, http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/pr/2004/
040831.htm; Press release, Ohio State Univ., No-Till Farming Offers a Quick Fix To
Help Ward Off Host Of Global Problems (Apr. 15, 2004), http://researchnews.osu.edu/
archive/notill.htm; Lisa Raffensperger, A Fresh Green for No-Till Farming, WORLD
RESOURCES INST., Feb. 19, 2008, http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/286.
65. Larry Rohter, Shipping Costs Start To Crimp Globalization, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/business/worldbusiness/03
global.html?_r- &em&oref=-slogin.
66. ScienceDaily.com, SARS: A Model Disease, Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/071121085715.htm.
67. ENVTL. ENCYCLOPEDIA 559-60 (William P. Cunningham et al., 2d ed. 1998)
(introduced species); USGS, Frequently Asked Questions About the Zebra Mussel,
http://fl.biology.usgs.gov/Nonindigenous-Species/Zebra-mussel-FAQs/zebra-mussel-
faqs.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
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flood, war, or earthquake at such a factory might devastate the world
economy.
68
Living conditions should continue to have the high qualities we
have come to expect-including health care, communications, and
product reliability and safety-but without the material excesses we can
no longer afford. When Samuel Gompers, the founder and long-time
leader of the American Federation of Labor, was asked what American
workers wanted, he replied, "More." 69 We cannot afford very much
"more" anymore, not in the United States and not in other parts of the
world,70 but we can have "better" worldwide. "Better" is the new, less
carbon-intensive world.
68. See Lawrence V. Snyder & Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Nat'l Acad. of Eng'g,
Managing Disruptions to Supply Chains, THE BRIDGE, 2006, http://www.nae.edu/nae/
bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/MKEZ-6WHQGT?OpenDocument.
69. Currarino, supra note 1.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains brief discussions of methods other than
carbon taxation for reducing CO2 emissions.
A. Subsidies
Examples of subsidies would include tax credits for purchasing
fuel-efficient automobiles, 26 U.S.C. § 30 (2007), or for installing home
renewable energy systems, 26 U.S.C. § 25C (2007). A major problem
with subsidies is that we may not be able to afford them in light of the
very large federal deficits and national debt.
Subsidies may effectively encourage the development of new
technologies or bring to the citizen the benefit of positive externalities,
but they also may go awry. For example, the subsidies for solar
collectors in the Carter Administration often produced equipment with
high prices and low quality.71
Questions that should be asked when designing a system of
subsidies to reduce CO2 emissions include:
1. For a subsidy to encourage switching from older vehicles to more
efficient hybrids, is it better to subsidize the average citizen who will use
the hybrid only a small part of each day, or to subsidize a delivery or taxi
business that may use the vehicle many hours per day?
2. How much does subsidizing a fuel-efficient car result in reduced
fuel consumption as the same miles are driven more efficiently, and how
much does the increased fuel efficiency merely allow more driving,
rather than fuel use reduction?
3. Is it better to subsidize wind energy or solar energy or biomass or
efficiency?
4. Is it better to subsidize home installations or the probably more
efficient, better maintained, and more carefully purchased large industrial
installations? Even if the industrial facility might be more efficient,
should home installations still be favored to garner political support and
to raise public consciousness?
5. How can one get the greatest carbon reduction per dollar of
subsidy, when both legislative and administrative decisions are often the
product as much of horse-trading as of wisdom?
71. See, e.g., Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618 (30% of the first $2,000
and 20% of the next $8,000); Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-223, (40% of the first $10,000 in expenditures).
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Most of these questions, it may be noted, would not need to be
asked about a carbon tax.
B. Regulations
Regulations might set limits on the allowable emissions of CO2. The
problem with a limit is that it gives no incentive to those already below
the limit to improve further even though a significant increase in
efficiency could be obtained inexpensively, and it may close operations
above the limit whose output is still needed.
Regulations may be effective, but they may also have unintended
consequences. The original Corporate Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE")
standards attempted to reduce gasoline consumption by increasing the
miles per gallon of cars sold in the United States.72 Although CAFE
improved gas mileage in cars, CAFE did not apply to trucks such as
minivans, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks, so CAFE contributed
to the expansion of production of these gas-guzzling vehicles.
A carbon tax would not present problems like these, although it
would raise other issues, as discussed in the text.
C. Cap-and-Trade
A cap-and-trade program creates allowances to pollute. Those
allowances might be awarded to those already in the industry based on
their current pollution levels, or they might be owned by the public and
auctioned off to industry. Those most easily able to reduce their pollution
might buy the pollution rights of an old polluting facility to allow the
opening of several cleaner facilities. Compared to regulation, cap-and-
trade provides incentives for even the cleaner facilities to improve, while
not shuttering the dirty facilities until some new facility is ready to
replace the dirty facility's output. The cap can be set to decrease over
time, perhaps five percent annually, to incentivize further cleaning up the
environment.
Cap-and-trade programs can be successful, but the U.N. program on
carbon cap-and-trade has drawn criticism. 73
72. 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-32919 (2007).
73. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ball, U.N. Warming Program Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., July
11, 2008, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article-print/SB121573736662544537
(criticizing approval of natural-gas-fueled electric generating plants under the cap-and-
trade system); Leila Abboud, Carbon King: Economist Strikes Gold In Climate-Change
Fight, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2008, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article-print/.
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It is not clear how cap-and-trade will operate in regard to
international trade between nations that subscribe to cap-and-trade and
nations that do not or that have significantly differing systems of cap-
and-trade.
74
In a cap-and-trade system, someone must decide how to allocate
carbon emission allowances. The allowances might be awarded based on
existing emissions, but that system would favor those who now have
high emissions because they have not acted to reduce their emissions and
penalize those who have been working hard to lower emissions.
Awarding emissions rights based on evaluation of particular industries
and practice is likely to be highly politicized. To have the public own the
right to emit, and then to sell this right to industry, may be desirable, but
to do so may be withdrawing capital from the industries most needing to
invest capital in emissions reduction. "The truth, perhaps inevitably, is
that as carbon-cap laws become closer to reality, almost no one is happy.
Coal-burning energy firms fear they'll be destroyed. Environmentalists
worry that the energy lobby will gut the bills."
75
A carbon tax would avoid many of these issues.
SB120535230851631199.html (noting that the London-based Climate Exchange PLC,
"which handles about 90% of the trading on carbon exchanges, [has] a market
capitalization of roughly $1.31 billion.").
74. See, e.g., the discussion of possible solutions and problems in Stavins,
Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, pp. 11-
13, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Sept. 2008), http://ssm.com/abstract=1262323.
75. See, e.g., Robin Pagnamenta, Royal Dutch Shell Threatens to Quit Europe Over
Carbon-Charging Proposals, TIMES OF LONDON, Apr. 10, 2008, available at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/natural-resources/article
3716388.ece. Clive Thompson, A Green Coal Baron?, N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 22,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/magazine/22Rogers-t.html?_r-l
&scp=l&sq=green%20coal%20baron&st=-cse&oref=-slogin; James Kanter, The Trouble
With Markets for Carbon, N. Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20emissions.html.
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